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Introduction 
 
While pirates have been the subject of numerous movies, books and plays—from 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s timeless novel, Treasure Island, written in 1883; to the 
classic Disney movie of the same title produced in 1950; to the recently released 
“based-on-a-true story” film, Captain Phillips—the matter is hardly fictional. 
With almost 1,200 prisoners taken captive by pirates from 2010 to 2011 and over 
100 casualties in 2011 alone, it is evident that Somali piracy has made an 
impeccable return in the twenty-first century.1 
For millennia, actually dating back as early as 75 B.C., when Julius Caesar 
found his life interrupted by a Sicilian piracy attack, pirates have plagued the sea, 
violently attacking seafarers and greatly affecting transoceanic trade.2  Authors 
Homer and Cicero noted incidents “involving ancient Greek and Roman mariners” 
and Western Europeans weathered Viking attacks during the Middle Ages. 3 
However, the most notorious onslaughts occurred during the Golden Age of 
Piracy (which spanned from 1570 to 1730). During this era, countries such as 
Britain, France, and the United States, hired privateers to harass Spanish fleets 
because of their frustration with Spanish dominance of the Caribbean.4 As Spain 
continued to conquer and colonize the Americas, privateers quickly recognized 
the vast presence of silver, gold, spices, and exotic goods aboard ships. Thus, the 
harassment that privateers were commissioned for quickly made a transition to 
lucrative pirate missions of travelling the sea for capital gains. 
Due to enhanced onshore military surveillance during the 18th century, the 
number of pirate attacks decreased sharply and the Golden Age of Piracy came to 
an end. Additionally, the invention of the steam engine provided an alternative 
mode of transportation that would mitigate travel by sea. With fewer boats 
journeying through international waters, nations cut their naval patrol and began 
investing money in new technologies. However, decades later, as international 
trade increased following the Cold War, individuals soon began to recognize the 
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opportunities for capital gain through sea robbing.5 Thus, a form of crime that 
many believed to be long dead has reappeared in the 21st century, causing 
immense and costly problems to global trade and countries around the world. 
In the last decade in particular, piracy in the African waters, especially 
surrounding Somalia, has vastly increased. According to statistics supplied by the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the 219 attacks by Somali pirates in 2010 
made up 49 percent of the total piracy attacks worldwide. In that same year, 
Somali pirates hijacked 49 ships, while taking 1,016 seafarers hostage. However, 
pirates never intend to harm their hostages, as their ultimate goal is always 
seeking financial compensation. The One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) 
approximates that the total ransom paid to Somali pirates reached $238 million in 
just 2010 alone.6 A new study estimates that Somali pirates reaped as much as 
$413 million in ransom payments from 154 hijackings from 2005 to 2012.7 
The expansion of Somali piracy has caused immense amounts of harm on 
the global trade market. It is estimated that the losses suffered globally range from 
$1 billion to over $16 billion per year.8 Within this figure, only a small amount is 
attributed to direct costs, such as paying ransom. The larger part of that figure 
comes from indirect costs, such as delays/failure in delivering cargo (breach of 
contract), reduction in the value of goods, or the extension of the ship rental and 
staff salary. Additionally, piracy affects the willingness of seafarers to sail on 
high-risk routes (e.g. the Gulf of Aden in the Horn of Africa). Thus, many 
companies are battling the reality of staff refusing work. Effects such as these 
ultimately cause financially detrimental consequences to companies. For example, 
hijacked ships result in transportation delay, which ultimately leads to higher fuel 
cost, increased wages for workers, and diminishes a company’s competitiveness. 
Lastly, the threat of hijackings has coerced many shipping companies and ship-
owners to purchase more expensive insurance packages. Because of incidences of 
piracy, many insurance companies now require a specific “kidnap and ransom” 
policy, which can cover the cost of ransom and the arrangements required with 
the payment.9 
As studies show that the economic impacts of piracy are at an all-time 
high, this paper will argue that the Somali pirates who infest the waters off the 
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Horn of Africa are causing significant financial damage to international 
commerce by elevating global trade costs. 
 
 
Rise of Piracy in Somalia 
 
Due to a previous civil war, absence of central government, and lack of natural 
resources, Somalia is presently one of the most underdeveloped and chaotic 
countries in the world. It is widely believed that the inability to restore a 
functioning government is the direct cause behind Somalia’s security problems 
and ruined economy.10 Because of Somalia’s poor economic circumstances, many 
individuals who are dissatisfied with the status quo seek unconventional ways to 
improve their respective financial circumstances by any means possible. The poor 
socioeconomic situation in the country paired with Somali citizens’ desperation to 
alter their living conditions are the large stimuli in the rise and expansion of 
piracy throughout international waters. 
After the civil war, the country was left in mayhem with no formal 
parliament for more than two decades.11 With anarchy spreading for years, it was 
imperative to come up with a temporary solution for the well-being of the country. 
Thus, in 2000, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed after 
fourteen attempts to create a functioning government post-civil war. Although 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is the current president of Somalia and represents the 
semi-success of the TFG, the party still lacks cohesion and control of the entire 
country.12 Particularly, the lawlessness has allowed Somali pirates to advance 
their activities with protection of anarchist clans, and most recently the Jihad 
militia Al-Shabaab that controls the Southern part of the country. According to 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), while Somali pirates only initially 
operated in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (within the vicinity of their 
native country), the additional support they have gained has helped extend their 
range as far away as 1200 sea miles from the capital of Mogadishu.13 
Contrary to popular belief, Somali piracy did not begin initially out of the 
desire to exploit the vulnerabilities of their failed, lawless state. Some of the first 
low-scale pirate attacks carried out in the Horn of Africa acted as measures to 
counter illegal fishing in Somali waters. After a civil war erupted in the country in 
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1991, the last functioning government faced a collapse. Consequently, the 2,000 
miles of Somali coastline appeared open for foreign vessels to intrude and plunder 
the fisheries, due to lack of government security.14 Not only is its coastline the 
longest in Africa, it is also rich with shrimp, lobster, tuna, and many other 
valuable sea products.15 Yet the vast potential of the industry was never brought 
to fruition because the country lacked laws to ensure the safeguard of the 
seaboard. The government absence also caused the once reliable Somali 
coastguard to vanish, as there was no budget to support their presence. 
Consequently, the Somali waters became a site of an international free-for-all, 
with numerous fishing fleets from around the world illegally plundering the 
country’s stocks and freezing out Somalia’s own rudimentarily-equipped 
fishermen.16 With the nonexistence of government policy and stable economic 
structure, Somalia was, and is still, unable to effectively combat the crimes of 
illegal fishing. 
As many countries began to realize Somalia’s lack of ability to 
appropriately counter the frequent theft in their waters, Yemeni fisherman became 
the most prominent group to illegally fish off Somalia’s coast. There are various 
claims that state that Yemeni fisherman would dismantle and/or steal Somali 
fishing nets for their respective gains. 17  Another UN report asserts that an 
estimate of $300 million worth of seafood is stolen from Somalia’s coastline 
annually.18 As a result, Somali fisherman began using small boats and weapons in 
order to accost the Yemeni fisherman, forcing them to throw the fish overboard. 
Moreover, they would also confront other potential ships suspected of illegal 
fishing, and hold the crew hostage until they paid a fine for deterrence. 
Although these attacks originally began out of desperation to save local 
fishing industries, Somali piracy ultimately grew into an international problem as 
their waters became not only overfished, but also polluted by illegally dumped, 
harmful waste.19 In 2005, the United Nations Environmental Program reported the 
presence of uranium radioactive and other hazardous deposits in the water, which 
led to a rash of respiratory ailments and skin diseases breaking out in villages 
along the Somali coast. At the time of the report, the UN cited that “it cost $2.50 
per ton for a European company to dump these types of materials off the Horn of 
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Africa, as opposed to $250 per ton to dispose of them cleanly in Europe.”20 The 
blatantly egregious acts of other countries went virtually unchecked throughout 
the entire 1990s.21 As these events began to culminate, it was evident that Somali 
fishermen had to start looking out for themselves and their own financial 
stability—and they did this through piracy. 
 
 
International Implications of the Attacks 
 
The maritime piracy attacks that transpire off the Horn of Africa are severely 
disrupting international trade. The Far East-Europe route is one of the world’s 
most active transcontinental maritime routes, as it receives nearly 20 percent of all 
global trading activities and more than 80 percent of trade moves through the Gulf 
of Aden. More specifically, more than 20,000 ships carrying most of the world’s 
affordable clothing, crude oil, and dry commodities pass through this route 
annually.22 However, on this route, there is an important barrier by the Puntland 
area in northeast Somalia. As self-ruling clans and warlords govern that unstable 
region, the adjacent Gulf of Aden harbors copious amounts of Somali pirates. 
Their main goals are to hijack ships and seize the transported goods, holding them 
until companies pay the ransom in order to retrieve their cargo and crewmembers. 
Consequently, this route adequately reflects the significant impacts of maritime 
piracy on global shipping and world development.23 
The financial implications of maritime piracy are widespread. With a lack of 
central government, Somali pirates exploit their surrounding waters, leaving the 
cargo frequently transported between Europe and Asia endangered. One major 
implication is that the attacks have forced major shipping companies to adjust 
their routes from the Far East to Europe. For example, many companies are 
altering their courses from the Gulf of Aden to the Cape of Good Hope or the 
Suez Canal in order to decrease the likelihood of pirate attacks. Such changes add 
significant additional costs. Attacks have created extra costs for fuel and higher 
insurance premiums, which ultimately create an additional burden on consumers 
in the form of higher prices for their goods.24 It is estimated that if one-third of the 
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Far-East European cargo routes were diverted via the Cape of Good Hope, it 
would trigger $7.5 billion extra in expenses worldwide.25 
The timeliness of shipments and delayed delivery of transported cargo is 
another consequence that stems from pirate attacks and the necessity of rerouting 
vessels. Unfortunately, the uncertainty of receiving scheduled cargo creates often 
deters companies, thus significantly decreases trade opportunities. While it is 
difficult to study the effects of insecurity, many studies have been done that 
demonstrate that more transparency about the measures being used to combat 
piracy will result in higher volumes of trade. Ultimately, piracy can significantly 
affect the gross domestic product of countries whose trade it disrupts.26 
Through data analysis and empirical application, it was discovered that the 
number of hijackings is the most relevant variable to the economic effects of 
piracy. Studies show that each increase in the number of attacks indefinitely 
hinders the amount of exports of a country. More specifically, these studies found 
that the effect of an additional hijacked vessel can decrease a country’s exports by 
about 1.1 percent. The study found that trade losses due to piracy attacks between 
Europe and Asia total $24.5 billion in just 2008 alone.27 
In an additional study done by the same authors, the percentage of piracy 
acts by Somali pirates is compared to incidents involving Malaccan pirates 
(competitors of Somali pirates that plague the Strait of Malacca), specifically on 
the Europe-East Asia trade route. From 1999 to 2008, there was a clear increase in 
the amount of Somali hijackings, juxtaposed to a sharp decline in Malaccan pirate 
attacks. Losses in trade caused by Somali pirates multiplied by six from 1999 to 
2008, while the losses caused by Malaccan pirates were reduced by one-quarter.28 
Since 2009, major economic powerhouses have begun deploying naval 
forces along the Gulf of Aden in order to protect shipments transported on the Far 
East-Europe route. Data demonstrates that the absence of government intervention 
is a large factor in the rise of piracy attacks. From 2007 to 2008, piracy incidents 
rose by seven times, which undeniably could have been mitigated with better 
administration involvement. If the governments had not interfered, total traffic 
volumes would have reduced by 30.25 percent, solidifying the theory that 
maritime piracy in Somalia is truly affecting global shipping companies’ regular 
activity. While the affected costs vary, the overall economic welfare loss is 
substantially superior, as it entails the losses due to reduction in traffic volumes 
and efficiency loss due to using an alternative route. Considering that 80 percent 
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of current international trade is transported by sea, a reduction in these trips can 
bring shocking consequences to the global economy.29 
Overall, the empirical analysis demonstrated an expected annual loss of 
$30 billion on the various countries that utilize the Gulf of Aden shipping route. 
Thus, it is imperative for governments and international organizations to take up 
effective measures against modern maritime piracy, as the economic stakes are 
extremely pertinent to the health of the global economy.30 
 
 
Domestic Implications of Piracy: 
 
Although Somali piracy attacks are often only regarded by the international 
community because of their impact on global trade, the effects of these organized 
attacks in Somalia itself are frequently ignored. While there is no singular cause 
to the rise of piracy in the Puntland area and the rest of the Horn of Africa, it is 
widely accepted that the economic hardships in the country cause Somali citizens 
to seek extreme measures of survival through piracy. Interestingly, the successes 
of Somali piracy attacks have resulted in short-term positive financial impacts on 
the country’s economy, specifically through the creation of secondary businesses 
in the region. Mainly, citizens can take advantage of Somali piracy by: becoming 
a “foot soldier,” completing skilled work for the pirates, financing the attacks, or 
handling the fiscal matters after the attacks are successful. 
As piracy attempts are regarded as high-risk, there is high demand for 
low-level pirates that are able and willing to carry out hijackings. These “foot 
soldiers” are sent to sea with crewmembers with the sole purpose of locating 
valuable vessels to seize. Once these low-level pirates successfully take control 
over a boat, their task is to return to shore, as it is necessary for a negotiator (also 
known as an “interpreter”) to assess the value of assets aboard. The World Bank 
reports that interpreters are paid $10,000 to $30,000 US for their services.31 If the 
low-level pirates successfully hijack the ship, they are compensated accordingly 
for their services. It is estimated that “foot soldiers” receive $30,000 to $75,000 
per raid, but no more than 2.5 percent of the total ransom payment. 32  An 
additional bonus of $5,000 is given to the first man who boards the ship—as the 
individual who initiates close contact first has the most risk of dying before his 
other counterparts.33 However, Matlock also mentions that in the event that these 
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low-level workers received a cash advance before the attack, they are charged 100 
percent interest on compensation. 
Unfortunately, these workers rarely use their illegally acquired assets for 
building a sturdy life for themselves. The World Bank study notes that the most 
commonly reported expenses of these individuals are for sex workers or slaves, 
alcohol, and expensive cars. Additionally, after deductions are made from trip 
expenses (food and fines for bad behavior), the “foot soldiers” are left with little-
to-no money, requiring them to participate in additional attacks, perpetuating the 
problem further.34 
Aside from the need for “foot soldiers,” there is also a large market for 
individuals able to meet the vast consumer interests of pirates. Mainly, they 
require workers to help the pirates attain the ostentatious lifestyle they have 
worked so hard to display. For example, there is a large market for foreign cars 
and speedboats, which creates positions for sales people and mechanics as a 
counter necessity. In addition, to accommodate pirates’ desire for flamboyant 
homes on the coastline, various professionals are needed to make their dreams 
come to reality. Thus, business opportunities for local professional carpenters, 
electricians, gardeners, and suppliers become available.35 Additional employment 
opportunities are available for local bookkeepers that are able to aid successful 
pirates smuggle, transfer, or launder their ransom payments. 
Canadian freelance journalist Jay Bahadur, who frequently writes about 
Somali piracy notes, “as in any pyramid scheme, the clear winner is the man at 
the top.”36  Thus, venture capitalists possess the most fundamental role in all 
piracy attacks. These financiers invest initial funds in boats, supplies, and low-
level pirates in order to pioneer the piracy onslaughts. 37  These investors 
reportedly collect 30-70 percent of the ransom payments, depending on their 
initial investment. It is common for sole investors to receive as much as 50 
percent of the ill-gotten gains, due to the financial risks they undertake upon 
primary backing.38 
Although there may be short-term financial benefits of Somali piracy, the 
World Bank study demonstrates that the presence of ransom payments is only 
continuing to ruin the Somali economy. Contrary to popular belief, most of the 
money secured from piracy attacks stays in the country. As most financiers are 
warlords, they use their capital to “pay for private militias, buy political protection, 
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and reinvest in new pirate operations.” Additionally, these individuals use these 
funds to invest in legitimate, diversified business opportunities such as real estate 
and hotels. The issue with this underground economy is that money coming in the 
country remains untaxed. 39  If there were an official, structured government 
present within the country, the illegal money that pirates and their accomplices 
control would be circulated with the economy and it would be taxed. As a result, 
the Somali government would be able to provide adequate resources for 
infrastructure, education, and potential redistribution of wealth through subsidies 
and government assistance. 
Though Somali pirates’ violent attacks clearly have vast financial impacts 
on their own country’s economic structure and global trade costs, these criminals 
truly believe they are doing their country a great service. In an interview with 
Sugule Ali, an infamous Puntland Pirate, he described his work as nationalistic. 
Ali claims that Puntland pirates do not see themselves as sea bandits and urges the 
world to see them as a coast guard patrolling their seas.40 
 
 
Addressing Somali Piracy & Proposed Resolutions 
 
As the prevalence of Somali pirate attacks continues to drastically affect the 
global economy, it is essential that the international community work diligently to 
prevent further attacks. The resurgence of maritime piracy in the twenty-first 
century has forced the United Nations Security Council to confront the issue of 
piracy head-on in recent years. Since its reemergence, a slew of recommendations, 
resolutions, and security mitigation tactics have been employed in order to reduce 
the risk of attacks. In the past, the Security Council Resolutions advised 
individual states to discipline the pirates. For example, the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) “condemns the acts of piracy taking 
place off the coast of Somalia and calls for nations to take action both on land and 
at sea to alleviate the problem.” 41  This declaration not only condemns and 
deplores all acts of piracy, it also provides states with various tools to handle the 
issue. Some of the advice includes urging states with naval vessels to deter using 
high-risk routes, share information about acts of piracy with other nations and the 
International Maritime Organization, and calls upon states to cooperate in 
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determining jurisdiction; for example, prosecuting individuals responsible for acts 
of piracy.42 
Although this provided states with preliminary advice for how to act on 
the situation, a new, resolution achieved on April 27, 2010, goes further to 
address the issue of what to do with pirates after their arrest. Because the topic lay 
dormant for many years, the procedure for effective punishment was not clear. 
The Security Council calls on “all states to criminalize piracy under national laws.” 
Essentially, this decree stated that failure to prosecute individuals who committed 
acts of piracy demonstrated a public undermining of anti-piracy efforts. Thus, the 
council implores countries to criminalize piracy in their domestic laws and 
provide effective jurisprudence for these wanton actions.43 
Because of the failed government in Somalia, the pirates in the Gulf of 
Aden essentially do as they please. A senior economist in the World Bank’s 
research department states, “piracy is a symptom of Somalia’s political system.”44 
Due to the anarchy in the country and the inability of officials to control the 
territorial waters, Somali pirates have expanded their attacks—capturing some the 
world’s largest ships and acquiring millions of dollars in ransom.45 Thus, it is key 
to “go after the system, not just the pirates.”46 While the Transitional Federal 
Government made an attempt to govern the country, it is clear that Somalia needs 
additional aid from a number of developed countries in order to truly eliminate 
the problem. As it is evident that Somali citizens are turning to these crimes due 
to poor economic stability, a viable financial system needs to be established in 
order to provide alternative means of livelihood. The overall goal of onshore 
preventative measures must be to eliminate the source of the problem – the 
desperation that compels Somali citizens to engage in acts of piracy. 47  An 
example of preventative onshore efforts can be the proactive outreach to Somali 
youth that discourages them from seeing piracy as their only means to success.48 
While the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations have made 
efforts to decrease piracy through policy changes and restructuring the 
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government within Somalia, most of the efforts to combat these crimes take place 
offshore. 
While the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea established the 
responsibility of nations in their use of the ocean and creates appropriate principle 
for transoceanic trade, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions go more 
in depth about the ability of nations to prosecute suspected pirates. Any state has 
the authority to seize a ship suspected of infiltration by pirates, and bring the 
individuals to its territory for a trial in its respective court. However, Western 
navies often are too complacent in their punishment of pirates and states are 
seldom comfortable using these powers and often fail to seek prosecution.49 Often, 
even if the pirates are caught by naval patrol, the suspected pirates are able to 
return back to their country’s shoreline without penalty. Many countries prefer to 
decline jurisprudence, as they are deterred by costs and an ambiguous code of 
conduct, which appears to leave the crime without reprimand.50 
The IMB estimates that about half of piracy attacks go unreported due to 
the inconvenience and slow nature of successful investigations. 51  Many 
researchers argue that the NATO Operation Ocean Shield possesses no 
framework to appropriately deal with the discipline of pirates, especially 
concerning their arrest and trial. Thus, attempted piracy attacks have doubled as 
pirates recognize the lack of consequences. Approximations show that there are 
only 1,000 to 3,000 at sea. Therefore, the arrest and trial of these individuals 
would make an increase in the impacts of piracy on world development.52 
This has led to a search for an effective, cheaper solution for the 
punishment of pirates. For example, a common practice is the signing of bilateral 
agreements with states to address the technical needs of the trial.53 For example, 
many trials related to piracy were taking place in Kenya. During a brief period, 
the country’s judicial system was overburdened; however, the international 
community increased funding and two months later, a newly improved courtroom 
was opened in Mombasa.54 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has transformed from acts of despair to full-
blown organized crime. The leaders of the crime ring frequently stay at home, 
while they have their manpower execute the acts on their behalf, and they remain 
unpunished. It is undeniable that to effectively combat Somali piracy their 
                                                        
49
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government system must be rebuilt and justice must be rendered on Somali 
territory.55 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is irrefutable that the government instability, shattered economy, and violence 
present in Somalia pose internal threats as well as threats to the international 
community. As Somalia’s coastal waters remain unprotected and overfished, and 
its government prone to Islamic insurgence, Somalia is notorious as one of the 
most impoverished and dangerous nations according to a 2006 Forbes report.56 
The country has demonstrated minimal growth since the civil war in 1991, forcing 
Somali citizens to act out of desperation in order to survive. As this paper 
demonstrates, studying the country’s current economic and political environment 
and as well as its history is pivotal to understanding how the volatility in Somalia 
led to the development of organized pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. Piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden has evolved from erratic acts of despair to full-blown 
organized crime. Even since the establishment of the Transitional Federal 
Government, piracy attacks have rapidly increased, with record numbers of 
incidents beginning in 2005. Without government intervention, Somali piracy 
cannot be effectively combated. The Somali government must be rebuilt and 
justice must be rendered on Somali territory.57 
While the international community is attempting to combat the issue of 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden through enhanced surveillance and naval patrols, there 
has been no visible decrease in piracy behavior thus far. Piracy continues to be the 
main source of income for many coastal communities in Somalia, as many pirates 
do not fear the consequences of being apprehended.58 Because it is very costly to 
exert jurisdiction, Somali pirates remain unfazed by their actions, as they often 
returned to their home country with minimal repercussions. Thus, many shipping 
companies are left to deal with piracy attacks on their own, resulting in billions of 
dollars lost in annual trade. It is undeniable that as long as Somalia remains 
impoverished, with no repercussions for suspected pirates, these attacks will 
continue to occur at a greater rate, while simultaneously elevating global trade 
costs—affecting consumers’ pockets worldwide. 
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